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THE EFFECT OF VIDEO WEATHER TRAINING PRODUCTS ON 
GENERAL AVIATION PILOTS’ FLIGHT BEHAVIOR 
 
William Knecht, Jerry Ball 
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, OK, USA 
Michael Lenz 
FAA Headquarters, Washington, DC, USA 
 
 This study examined the effect of video weather training products on general aviation (GA) 
pilot flight behavior. 
 Fifty pilots participated. Training products were two popular GA weather training videos, plus 
a non-weather video as control. Pilots watched one video. Then, in the CAMI flight simulator, 
they flew a challenging 1.5-h visual flight rules (VFR) mission. Along the route, terrain rose 
slowly, with cloud bases squeezing pilots between ground and clouds. 
 The control group penetrated significantly farther into the deteriorating weather. Otherwise, 
no significant safety differences were observed for time spent in instrument meteorological condi-
tions (IMC), time scud running, or time below 500’ ground clearance. Neither instrument rating 
nor locality of pilot residence appeared to affect these safety variables. 
 Flight behavior—complete penetration of the weather versus diverting—could be predicted 
for 80% of pilots, using a model with training product + initial takeoff hesitation + pilot age. 
 
 The term “adverse weather” involves multiple factors such as restricted visibility due to low cloud ceilings, fog, 
rain, snow, thunderstorms, or airframe icing. Adverse weather is a perennial concern to GA. Analyses of GA acci-
dents from the 1970s-2000s show that, despite a relatively low incidence rate for weather-related accidents (4-5%, 
depending on data source and classification scheme), their fatality rate is 3-4 times higher than for other GA acci-
dent causes (Bazargan, 2005; Bud, Mengert, Ransom, & Stearns, 1997; NTSB, 1989; NTSB, 2005). This is largely 
because weather accidents often involve flight into terrain or loss of control, which typically kills all onboard.  
 Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) researchers were tasked to explore whether video weather training 
products significantly affect pilot flight behavior in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The research was 
conducted in two phases. Phase 1 examined data collected from January to July, 2008. 
 
Method 
 
Weather training products/control materials.  
 
 Learning theories fall into 3 categories: behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. Because behaviorist 
training methods arguably apply best to procedural tasks, one cognitivist and one constructivist training product 
were selected.  
 Cognitivism focus on brain functions, particularly memory and information processing, suggesting that brains 
may functionally resemble computers, processing inputs to produce outputs (Waltz & Feldman, 1988). Whereas, 
constructivism expands on the computer metaphor, elevating cognition from a straightforward “information vector-
transformation” role to a somewhat richer “construction of an inner world” (von Glasersfeld, 1995). This “inner 
world” involves an organized set of mental representations of external objects, relations, and interactions.  
 Two well-known video weather training products were selected. Product 1 constituted the “constructivist prod-
uct.” It focused mainly on the aeronautical decision making aspects of weather flight. It offered systematic, mne-
monic risk factor checklists applicable to specific factors such as the weather in question, internal pilot factors af-
fecting performance (e.g., skill, health, fatigue), and factors external to the pilot that could affect risk-taking (e.g., 
passengers needing to arrive at their destination by a certain time). After each video lecture session, it presented hy-
pothetical flight scenarios for students to evaluate, based on the lecture content presented so far. 
 Product 2 constituted the “cognitive product.” This focused largely on the recognition of different cloud types, 
visibility conditions, horizon recognition, and terrain clearance. Exercises showed still pictures of weather situations 
as seen aloft, asking what recognition factors were problematic, and for go/no-go decisions on VFR flight.  
 The third video group—the Control group—received an FAA-produced video on aviation physiology, having 
nothing whatsoever to do with weather. 
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Research design 
 
 Table 1 depicts the basic design. Training product, instrument rating, and pilot’s state of residence were primary 
independent variables; age and flight hours were secondary. This gave a 3x2x2 between-groups design with 12 
treatment cells, ≥4 Ss per cell. Cells were equilibrated for age and flight hours during pilot assignment to treatments. 
 
Table 1. Experimental structure. 
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Participants 
 
 Following IRB approval, 50 GA pilot volunteers participated, providing informed consent. Mean age was 41.0 
(median = 39, SD = 17.5), mean flight hours was 1314 (median = 268, SD=2709). 
 Local pilots (those currently living in Oklahoma) were recruited from a list of pilots having participated in pre-
vious studies and by placing fliers in local flight schools. Non-local pilots were recruited through an advertisement 
in Flying magazine. 
 
Advanced General Aviation Research Simulator (AGARS) 
 
 AGARS is a real-time, fixed-based GA flight simulator configured as a Piper Malibu for this study.  A high-
resolution visual system and a 150° field of view allow precise presentation of meteorological conditions. AGARS 
captures up to 150 variables continuously at 30Hz for a four-hour mission and includes up to 85 programmable non-
routine events.  It utilizes an experimenter operating station (EOS) and an ATC workstation. During a flight sce-
nario, EOS allows the experimenter to visually monitor the cockpit and simulation environment. A digital camera 
records the cockpit, as well as pilot, ATC, and experimenter communications onto a stand-alone digital video re-
corder. 
 
Flight mission 
 
 Pilots planned a VFR flight from Amarillo, TX (AMA), to Albuquerque, NM (ABQ)—approximately 90 min-
utes in the Malibu at high-speed cruise. They were instructed to plan with two cockpit VORs (VHF OmniRange 
Navigation System), an ADF (Automatic Direction Finder), with access to in-flight Automated Weather Observing 
System (AWOS) weather updates. A data-collecting Web-based weather emulation of www.aviationweather.gov 
was written by the experimenters and made available for preflight planning (Figure 1). After preflight, a 15-minute 
break was given to each pilot. Subsequently, a 30-40-minute training session with AGARS was given, including 
autopilot, horizontal situation indicator (HSI), and Malibu flight parameters and characteristics (e.g., maximum/stall 
speeds, associated power settings).  
 The assigned route consisted of gradually rising terrain during the first two thirds of the flight, followed by a 
dramatic elevation change during the last one third. During the flight, pilots experienced deteriorating VFR weather 
conditions. Initially, visibility was set at 8 nm and was gradually decreased to 5 nm two thirds of the way along the 
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route. Concomitantly, cloud ceilings were lowered from 4500 feet AGL to 3500 AGL across the same terrain. As a 
result, ceilings gradually squeezed the pilots closer to the ground, resulting in a potentially dangerous flying situa-
tion with hazardous encounters throughout the course of the flight. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sample screenshot from the Web-based emulation of www.aviationweather.gov. 
 
Results 
 
 Flight duration was the only DV to satisfy the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test. Therefore, most analyses 
were done using non-parametric statistics. Table 2 shows key correlations (2-tailed p-values are in parentheses). 
 
Table 2. Correlations between key variables. 
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Instrument Rating 1.0        
State of Residence 3 1.0       
Pilot Age  .5231 (.0001) 3 1.0      
Pilot Flight Hours  .4011 (.004) 3  .757 (<.001) 1.0     
Flight Duration -.039  .042 -.423 (.002) -.270 1.0    
Minimum Dist to ABQ  .013  .013  .422 (.002)  .303 (.032) -.936 (<.001) 1.0   
Minutes scud running -.013 -.012  .051  .107  .013 -.042 1.0  
Minutes in IMC -.020 -.005 -.089 -.084  .028 -.035  .676 (<.001) 1.0 
Minutes < 500’ AGL -.281 (.048)  .144 -.167 -.289 (.041)  .379 (.007) -.384 (.006) -.095 -.174 
1rpb = Point-biserial correlation; 2rs = Spearman rho correlation;  Low p-values are in parentheses (all others are non-
significant (NS)); 3 No correlation run because sample had been partitioned for these factors. All p-values are 2-tailed. 
 
 Trivial correlations are discussed first (highlighted light gray). Older pilots were more likely to be instrument 
rated and to have more flight hours. Pilots with high flight hours were more likely to be instrument rated. Flight 
duration x minimum distance to ABQ (rs = -.936) merely shows that the longer pilots flew, the more likely they 
were to get close to ABQ. Minutes scud running x minutes in IMC (rs = .676) turned out to be partially a complex-
but-trivial side effect of the way scud running was defined. 
 Other correlations (medium gray) are non-trivial. Instrument-rated pilots spent slightly less time too close to 
the ground (<500’ AGL, rpb= -.281)—one indicator of potential hazard. Higher flight-hour pilots also spent less 
time too close to the ground (rs = -.289) and tended to stay farther away from ABQ (rs = .303), reflecting an incli-
nation to divert before completing the flight. 
 Finally, four significant and meaningful correlations (dark gray, boldface) show older pilots tending to have 
shorter flights (rs = -.423, .422, respectively). Effect size (r2) was about 18%. Ground clearance was also better-
maintained on shorter flights (rs =  .379, -.3 84, respectively), capturing the flight scenario’s tendency to “squeeze” 
pilots between clouds and terrain near ABQ. 
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 Takeoff hesitancy 
 
 Pilots were told that the best way to give good flight data was to treat this mission as if it were a real flight. 
Given those instructions, 12 of the 50 pilots initially stated that, having to fly this mission VFR, they would choose 
to not even take off. This was perhaps predictable, given the weather plus the fact of being scrutinized by FAA offi-
cials at an FAA facility. Therefore, to overcome any reservations they might have about being scrutinized, pilots 
who hesitated taking off were explicitly asked to do so and fly at least briefly. All complied. 
 Locality of pilot residence had no significant effect on takeoff hesitancy—18% of local (Oklahoma) pilots hesi-
tated versus 32% of non-local (non-Oklahoma) pilots (2-tailed pΧ2 = .251, NS). Neither did instrument rating predict 
hesitancy (15% for instrument rated v. 33% for non-instrument rated, 2-tailed px2 = .138, NS). Finally, despite the 
confidence often associated with experience, neither age nor flight hours seemed to affect hesitancy (2-tailed Mann-
Whitney U, pU  = .146, .625 respectively, NS). Overall, the cause of takeoff hesitancy appeared mysterious. 
 
 Effect of the weather training products on takeoff hesitancy. Hesitancy could have been caused by the weather 
training products. Table 3 shows the numbers of pilots who initially hesitated versus values expected by chance (in 
parentheses). The Yates-corrected px2 is .034, implying that the training groups differ. However, a statistical caveat 
clouded the results:  Half the cells had expected frequencies < 5, violating the 20% convention. Given that caveat, if 
this were indeed a reliable effect, pairwise tests of odds-ratios implied that the unusual group was the Control, where 
17 of 18 pilots showed no hesitancy to take off.  
 
Table 3. Takeoff hesitancy. 
 Trg Prod 1 Trg Prod 2 Control 
Yes 11 (11.3) 9 (12.1) 17 (13.6) Initial takeoff decision No 4 (3.7) 7 (3.9) 1 (4.4) 
.152  
 .004 Pairwise odds-ratios, 1-tailed p 
.037 
 
 In other words, studying a weather training product may have made pilots more hesitant to take off into deterio-
rating weather. However, cognitive priming is an alternate hypothesis, and will be revisited in the Discussion sec-
tion. 
 
 Effect of takeoff hesitancy on subsequent flight safety. The 12 hesitators did not fly demonstrably safer than the 
remaining 38 pilots. There were no significant differences between hesitators and non-hesitators for minutes spent in 
IMC, minutes scud running, or minutes < 500’ AGL (2-tailed Mann-Whitney pU = .102, .147, .498 respectively, all 
NS). However, hesitators did seem to continue their conservatism into their flight, making significantly briefer 
flights (pU = .002), with consequently less penetration into the marginal weather close to ABQ (pU < .001). 
 
 Net effect of the weather training products on subsequent flight safety. Did viewing a weather training product 
affect flight safety? Some signs point to yes, some to no. 
 The Control group showed significantly less takeoff hesitancy. It also displayed greater flight duration and, con-
sequently, lower minimum distance to ABQ (Kruskal-Wallis pKW = .007, .005 respectively). Follow-up pairwise 
Mann-Whitney U tests implied that the Control group was significantly different from both weather training prod-
ucts (pU-TRG1 x CONTROL = .011, .004 respectively and pU-TRG2 x CONTROL = .004, .005 respectively), although the two 
weather products themselves did not significantly differ (pU = .867, 1.0 respectively, NS).  
 Now—because the maximum hazard of this flight lay near the destination—we might be tempted to conclude 
that the longer flights of the Control group should predict greater risk exposure. However, no significant overall dif-
ferences were found between the three training groups for subsequent minutes spent in IMC, minutes scud running, 
or minutes < 500’ AGL (pKW = .245, .158, .812 respectively, all NS). Even though the Control group showed less 
hesitancy and longer flight duration, and even though longer flight duration correlated significantly with minutes < 
500’ AGL, the net effect of the weather training videos on subsequent flight safety seemed nonsignificant. 
 So, how can there be no significant differences in flight safety between the three training groups? If seeing the 
weather training video related to takeoff hesitancy, and takeoff hesitancy related to flight duration, and flight dura-
tion related to minutes spent < 500’ AGL—how could weather video not relate to minutes spent < 500’ AGL?  
 The answer lies in the nature of causation versus correlation. If each factor perfectly caused the next factor in 
the chain, then the first factor would perfectly predict the last. In symbolic logic, A ⇒ B (A implies B), and so on, so 
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A ⇒ B ⇒ C ⇒ D, therefore A ⇒ D. This is easy to see in a Venn diagram (Figure 2a). But, if each factor only par-
tially predicts the next factor, then the overall relational strength between the first and last factors can theoretically 
be zero (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. a) Venn diagram embodying causation A ⇒ B ⇒ C ⇒ D; b) Venn diagram embodying correlation A rAB 
B rBC C rCD D. 
 
Modeling the effect of training videos on flight behavior  
 
 When simple correlational models fail to explain effects, we turn to multivariate modeling. Here, cluster analy-
sis and binomial logistic regression were used to generate models capable of explaining these pilots’ flight behavior. 
Specifically, we wanted to predict if pilots would risk flying completely through the deteriorating weather (DV = To 
ABQ = 1/Yes or 0/No). Table 4 summarizes the smallest set of variables capable of doing that reliably.  
 
Table 4. Binary logistic regression for To ABQ 
 B pif term removed 
Age -  0.081 .002 
TO decision -21.20 .016 
Control  
 Trg Prod 1 -  3.08 
Trg Prod 2 - 2.53 
.006 
Constant    4.64  
Nagelkerke R2 = .594 
 
 Here, Takeoff Decision reflects “takeoff hesitancy,” as discussed earlier. The training product is broken out into 
its three groups. Negative B-weights mean that a positive value for the independent variable subsequently related to 
a reduced groupwise tendency to fly all the way to ABQ. For example, pilots hesitant to take off (TO Decision = 1) 
subsequently showed a reduced tendency to fly all the way to ABQ. Similarly, pilots receiving either weather train-
ing product subsequently showed reduced tendency to fly all the way to ABQ, compared to the Control group. 
 In practical terms, this is a moderately strong model, accounting for 64.0% of the explainable variance in the 
data. It implies that pilot experience (flight hours) may work in combination with an instinctive reaction to a weather 
situation and a training video to affect ultimate continuation into adverse weather. This elaborates somewhat on the 
conclusion reached earlier about training product, so we will revisit that theme in the Discussion section. 
 Table 5 compares the prediction success rate for completed flight to ABQ made by logistic regression (bold-
face) versus cluster analysis (italics, in parentheses). Grey cells represent successful predictions. 
 
Table 5. Success rate for binary logistic regression versus (cluster analysis) 
Predicted To ABQ  Observed To ABQ Did not make it to ABQ Made it to ABQ % correct 
Did not make it to ABQ 26 (27) 4 (4) 86.7 (87.1) 
Made it to ABQ 4 (0) 14 (16) 77.8 (81.3) 
Overall % correct Base logistic prediction rate = 62.5% 83.3 (91.5) 
 
 This shows that a simplified logistic model containing only pilot age, initial takeoff decision, and training prod-
uct correctly predicted 83% of these pilots’ overall decisions whether or not to fly through the deteriorating weather 
all the way to ABQ. 
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 Overall, this three-variable model produced a gain of about 21% from the base rate predicted by a constant only 
(62.5%). Compare this to the eight-variable cluster model (not shown) correct predictions of 91.5%, versus a “com-
plete” 15-variable logistic regression (not shown) where 100% of all cases were predicted correctly. However, note 
that the “complete” model was vastly overfitted, meaning it contained too many predictors, given the number of 
cases. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Assessing the influence of a video weather training product on GA flight behavior turns out to be a subtle task. 
If we try to demonstrate statistically significant direct training product effects on hazardous-flight variables, we can 
claim none. However, if we examine takeoff hesitancy in the face of marginal cloud ceiling and visibility at the des-
tination, we see greater average hesitancy in the two training product groups than in the control group. Pilots who 
hesitate tend to continue this conservativism into the flight, showing a greater tendency to divert to an alternate, 
rather than continuing on into deteriorating weather. So, there is a temptation to think that training product→takeoff 
hesitancy→shorter flight→lower risk exposure.  
 However, things are not quite that simple. First, training product does not directly correlate highly with hazard-
ous flight variables. Second, takeoff hesitancy could reflect nothing more than artificial conservatism induced by the 
presence of FAA experimenters at an FAA testing facility. Pilots receiving the training video may merely have been 
primed to know that the experiment was about weather and may have simply given the experimenters the initial be-
havior they thought the experimenters wanted, namely, a conservative response to a weather situation. 
 The situation brightens when we model pilots who made it all the way through the weather versus those who 
diverted to an alternate. In that case, we can predict how about 80% of pilots will behave, based on nothing more 
than whether they received a training product, whether they hesitated to take off, and their total flight hours. This 
may imply that video weather training products “bring out the conservative” in some pilots, but less so in others.  
 However, we should stop short of making either extreme claim—that these products have either no effect, or 
some definite positive effect. In fact, the entire question is analogous to building a house. A single brick, no matter 
how well-crafted, will not suffice to build an entire house. In other words, weather is a complicated subject. No mat-
ter how good any given chapter is, we need to read the entire book. 
 Phase 2 of this study revisited the flight behavior of these same pilots after of a time lapse of several months. 
The data are currently being analyzed, to be reported shortly. If flight behavior of the experimental pilots regresses 
to the mean, then we can more strongly assume that cognitive priming was operating and that measuring hazardous 
weather flight in simulo is an even more challenging task than we already know it is. 
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